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SALES--THE DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE IN WARRANTY ACTIONS
You are the attorney for a plaintiff who has been seriously
injured in an automobile collision which was witnessed by one
elderly gentleman who is to testify on behalf of your client.
Fearing that he will not live long enough to testify in court,
you take his deposition on a machine purchased from X cor-
poration, manufacturer of the product. Your witness dies a
week later. At the trial, with permission of the court, you at-
tempt to play back his testimony, only to discover that his voice
was not recorded because of a defect in the machine. Without
your eyewitness's testimony you lose the case and bring an
action against the manufacturer predicated on breach of war-
ranty. The defense is contributory negligence. Recovery? Should
contributory negligence bar recovery in an action based on war-
ranty? The purpose of this paper is to examine this question in
light of the case law and applicable sections of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
I. Tim NATUrE OF A WAmRANTY AcTioN
Historically, warranties have been viewed as contractual in
nature, an agreement between the manufacturer and the con-
sumer. Recently, however, courts have begun to impose liability
upon manufacturers for injuries caused by their defective
products as a matter of law;' this development seems to have
created some confusion as to the nature of a warranty action.
The leading case and the first to adopt the concept of strict
tort liability in the area of product liability was Greenman v.
Yu Za Power Products, Inc.2 In affirming a lower court judg-
ment against the manufacturer of a defective power tool, the
court stated:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an arti-
cle he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury .... 3
1. "As a matter of law" is here used in the sense that the courts are
imposing strict liability upon the manufacturers, but, of course, it is a jury
question whether the alleged breach was in fact the cause of the injury.
2. 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
3. Id. at 700, 377 P2d at 900. The plaintiff was injured while using a
machine manufactured by the defendant when a piece of wood flew up striking
1
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With liability imposed as a matter of law, apart from any
agreement between the manufacturer and the consumer, it would
appear that Greenman marked a radical departure from the
traditional basis of product liability. Prior to Greenman, how-
ever, the courts were headed towards strict liability within the
framework of warranty.
4
As evidenced by the abandonment of the privity requirement'
and a reluctance to allow manufacturers to limit their liability
for defective products,6 it is quite obvious that the warranty
action is no longer simply a contractual matter. It is said that
the action sounds in tort but retains as its substance the charac-
teristics of a contract,7 which partially explains the conflicting
views on whether contributory negligence should bar recovery.
If the warranty action is a matter of contract, then contributory
negligence logically should not bar recovery, since negligence
on the part of manufacturer is not in issue. If, on the other
him on the forehead. See also Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr.
896, 391 P2d 168 (1964). The Restatement of Torts has also adopted the
strict tort liability rule. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965),
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) The Seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer with-
out substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
4. 2 L. FRUTmER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[3] (1968).
5. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The
wife of a purchaser of an automobile sustained injuries because of a defective
steering system. The court, affirming a lower court judgment for the plaintiff,
said that a new automobile carries with it an implied warranty that it is suit-
able for the intended use, and that such warranty accrues to the benefit of the
ultimate purchaser.
6. Id. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-316 Subsection (1) (1966) provides:
If the agreement creates an express warranty words disclaiming it
are inoperative.
Subsection (2) provides:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must men-
tion merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous,
and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the ex-
clusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude
the implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose must be specific, and if the inclusion of such language
creates an ambiguity in the contract as a whole it shall be resolved
against the seller.
This is the language of the 1954 version of the Code.
2
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hand, the action is a matter of tort principles, then contributory
negligence should operate as a defense. If, however, its basis is
a combination of contract and tort, confusion results.
II. FuTRa CoNzusioN-CoNmImuToRy NEGLIoENcE v.
AssuMPTIoN oF RISK
Although there are other defensess that the courts tend to
confuse with contributory negligence, the distinction between
contributory negligence and assumption of risk seems to cause
the most trouble. Assumption of risk is often confused with the
defense of contributory negligence. In most instances the distinc-
tion is unimportant, for both will bar recovery in the ordinary
negligence action where they most frequently appear.
In an action based upon breach of warranty, however, as-
sumption of risk is almost always available as a defense,9 while
there are conflicting views as to whether contributory negli-
gence should be so available. The two defenses are undeniably
related, since with both the plaintiff is barred from recovery
because of his own conduct. The distinction between contribu-
tory negligence and assumption of risk was summarized in
Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco, Co. as follows:
In working out the distinction, the courts have arrived
at the conclusion that assumption of risk is a matter of
knowledge of the danger and intelligent acquiescence in
it, while contributory negligence is a matter of some
fault or departure from the standard of reasonable
conduct, however unwilling or protesting the plaintiff
may be. The two may co-exist, or either may exist with-
out the other. The difference is frequently one between
risks which were in fact known to the plaintiff, or so
obvious that he must be taken to have known them, and
7. Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 484 (3rd Cir.
1965). The plaintiff brought an action for personal injury, alleging that he
contracted cancer as a result of smoking Chesterfield cigarettes; the action
was predicated on negligence and breach of warranty. The defense was
assumption of risk.
8. Often, courts speak in terms of contributory negligence when the plain-
tiff misuses the product, where the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of
the injury, and where there was actually no breach of warranty. For a dis-
cussion of these basic distinctions, see 2 L. FRumER & M. FiDAN, PaoDucs
LrAnILITY § 16.01[3] (1968).
9. Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F2d 479, 485 (3rd Cir.
1965); 2 L. Fauimit & M. FiEmmAN, PRoDucTs LTABIITY § 16A[5] (1968).
[Vol. 22
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risks which he merely might have discovered by the
exercise of ordinary care.10
Often when a court speaks of contributory negligence barring
recovery, it is or should be speaking of assumption of risk.1
Thus, in Missouri Rag Co. v. Chemical Deliniting C0.12 where a
buyer used bags manufactured by the seller with knowledge of
their defects, the court spoke of the buyer's own negligence as
barring recovery. If the distinction drawn in Pritchard is
accurate, then the Missouri Bag Co. court actually denied re-
covery because the buyer assumed the risk when he used the
bags notwithstanding his actual knowledge of the defects.
The Pritchard court, holding that contributory negligence
should not be a defense to a warranty action, recognized a need
to distinguish assumption of risk as is ordinarily applied in a
negligence action from assumption of risk as a defense to a
warranty action. The court spoke of "assumption of risk in its
primary sense" as a voluntary exposure to a known risk which
is a defense to a breach of warranty action, and "assumption of
risk in its secondary sense" as synonomous with contributory
negligence and not a defense to a breach of warranty action.
Approaching the distinction in this manner would seem to re-
duce the possibility of confusion. Apparently, the Pritchard
court viewed the warranty action as contractual in nature since
it held that mere deviation from a standard of reasonable con-
duct, whether classified as contributory negligence or "assump-
tion of risk in its secondary sense," is inapposite as a defense.
lI. FoiRn DmmNFSE-MAmoRNo v. WEco PRODUCTS
In Marorrina18 the plaintiff, injured while opening a glass
toothbrush container manufactured by defendant, brought an
action based upon negligence and breach of warranty. While
recognizing that there was considerable conflict and confusion
on the subject of the availability of contributory negligence as
a defense to warranty actions, the court stated its position with-
out equivocation as follows:
Simply stated, we are of the view that where a plain-
tiff acts or fails to act as a reasonably prudent man in
10. Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F2d 479, 484-85 (3rd
Cir. 1965).
11. 2 L. FRumE & M. FP.IDmAN, PRODUCTS IArUr= § 16.01[3] (1968).
12. 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71 (1952).
13. Mariorino v. Weco Products, 45 NJ. 570, 214 A2d 18 (1965).
1970]
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connection with use of a warranted product ... and
such conduct proximately contributes to his injury, he
cannot recover. In short, in our judgment the well
known principle of contributory negligence in its broad
sense is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass all the
variant notions expressed in the cited cases as a basis
for refusing plaintiff a recovery when his own lack of
reasonable care joined or concurred with the defect in
the defendant's product as a proximate cause of the
mishap and his injury.
14
The Mariorino decision contains no minced language. The court
does not attempt to explain the availability of the defense by
discussing the nature of the warranty action,' 5 but rather states
its position as a matter of policy.
According to the Mariorino decision, the consumer is only
protected when using a warranted product in a reasonably pru-
dent manner. It seems that such an approach to products liabil-
ity loses sight of situations where one of the primary purposes
of the product is to protect the negligent consumer. An example
of such a product is the water skiing safety belt, the purpose of
which is to hold the water skier above the water when he falls.
If a skier carelessly comes too close to a dock, hits it, and is
knocked unconscious, should his negligence bar recovery when
the ski belt fails to hold him up because of some defect? Ac-
cording to Mariorino, since his own negligence proximately
caused or contributed to the injury, he is barred from recovery.
Another situation where the Mariorino approach could pro-
duce an unjust result is that of the automobile warranty. The
court in BahRman v. Hud8on Motor Car Co.' 6 summed up the
fallacy of allowing contributory negligence as a defense to auto-
mobile warranty actions when it stated:
It is undoubtedly true that the negligence of the driver
caused the car to overturn, but defendant's representa-
tions were not for the purpose of avoiding an accident,
but in order to avoid or lessen the serious damages that
might result therefrom .... The particular construc-
tion of the roof of defendant's car was represented as
14. Id. at 574, 214 A2d at 20.
15. Indeed, the court does not even distinguish between express and implied
warranty. It is therefore assumed that contributory negligence would bar
recovery with either.
16. 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
[Vol. 22
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protection against the consequences of just such careless
driving as actually took place. Once the anticipated
over-turning of the car did occur, it would be illogical
to excuse defendant from responsibility for these very
consequences.
17
While BahZman, involved an automobile warranty, certainly the
reasoning would apply to other similar situations, such as the
example of the water skier above.
Another objection to the Mariorino approach to products
liability is that it fails to appreciate fully the policy argument
for expanding the concept of consumer protection. As stated in
Greenm an:
The purpose of such [strict tort] liability is to insure
that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured per-
sons who are powerless to protect themselves.' 8
The courts often resort to this type of policy argument when
dealing with a solvent defendant. Obviously, the consumers are
not always "powerless to protect themselves" for often the de-
fect would cause little, if any, damage without the concurrence
of the consumer's own negligence.
IV. Tmi UNIFoRM COMRIOAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code' 9 provides no clear answer to
the question of whether contributory negligence should be ap-
posite as a defense to a breach of warranty action, but examina-
tion of the applicable sections does shed some light on the
problem. Under the Code, an express warranty is created by any
affirmation of fact or promise which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the "basis of the bargain" or by any description
of the goods which is made part of the "basis of the bargain,"
or by any sample or model which is made part of the "basis of
the bargain."2 0 It is generally agreed 2 1 that "basis of the bar-
gain" is the Code's equivalent to the traditional concept of con-
sumer reliance on the representations of the seller, which is
17. Id. at 692-93, 288 N.W. at 312.
18. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, 377
P2d 897, 901 (1963).
19. Hereinafter referred to as the Code.
20. UNIFo M COmmERCiAL CODE § 2-313(1).
21. 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GumE TO THE UNIFORM COM-
m RCIAL CODE 1.19101 at 58 (1964).
1970]
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retained as the crux of the express warranty. With the express
warranty it is arguably the better view that contributory negli-
gence should not bar recovery, for the consumer should be
afforded protection when he relies on the representations.2 2 It
has also been suggested that the consumer's negligent use of the
product might well be viewed as a manifestation of his reliance
upon the warranted quality of the product and the integrity of
the manufacturer. 23 Regardless of how one might view the prob-
lem, however, the basic distinction between express and implied
warranties should make it easier to understand a policy disal-
lowing contributory negligence as a defense to an express war-
ranty action.
Under the Code's treatment of implied warranties, the buyer
is offered a warranty of merchantability 24 and one of fitness
for a particular purpose.2 5 Although the seller might disclaim
these warranties, 28 the Code~does not preclude recovery where
the buyer deviates from some standard of conduct in using the
product. It would thus seem that the Maiorino decision is at
odds with the Code, since that case, in effect, held that the
product is warranted to be safe for use with ordinary care. In
a comment to the section on implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity, however, the following language is found:
In such an action [breach of warranty] an affirmative
showing by the seller that the loss resulted from some
action or event following his own delivery of the goods
can operate as a defense.
27
Does this language indicate that contributory negligence might
be a defense, or is it simply stating the obvious proposition
that, if the buyer's actions are the sole cause of his injury, this
will operate as a defense? Probably the latter is a correct con-
22. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FFIEDMAN, PRODucrs LIABILrry § 16.01[3] (1968).
23. Note, Contributory Negligence a.s a Defense to Warranty Actions, 39
TEmP. L.Q. 361, 363 (1966).
24. UNIFORM COmmcERCIAL CODE § 2-314. Subsection (1) provides in part:
Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale
if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that ind ....
25. Id. at § 2-315. This section provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or fur-
nish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the
next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
26. Id. at § 2-316.
27. Id. at § 2-314, Comment 13.
7
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struction of this language. The same comment also indicates
that "an examination of the goods which ought to have indi-
cated the defect" may be shown as a matter bearing on causa-
tion. Although this statement might cause the reader to pause,
it does not mean that a duty to inspect is imposed upon the
buyer but rather indicates that if he does inspect, then his
negligent failure to discover the defect might operate to bar
recovery.
The extent to which the consumer's own conduct affects his
chances of recovery in a warranty action under the Code is per-
haps best illustrated by an examination of the section providing
for the buyer's consequential damages. 28 The buyer is entitled
to such damages for "injury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty. 2 9 Arguably, if the
buyer's own negligence substantially contributes to his injury,
it would therefore not proximately result from the breach. In
deciding proximate cause, however, courts usually make many
policy determinations en route to arriving at a legal conclusion,
and it appears that the Code allows the court to use its own
discretion in determining whether the buyer's conduct should
operate as a defense and therefore bar recovery.
Assume, for example, that A sells B a pump; A knows that it
is to be used for the purpose of draining B's basement. The
pump is defective in that there is no ground wire. B, however,
installs the pump while standing ankle-deep in water and is
electrocuted. At the trial there is conflicting testimony on
whether the ground wire could have prevented the accident.
Under the Code would the death be considered as proximately
resulting from the defective product .30 Probably it would be a
policy decision. Following the Greenan rationale for imposing
strict tort liability, the court would look to the "deepest pocket"
28. Id. at § 2-715(2).
29. Id. at § 2-715(2) (b). One commentor, speaking of the effect of this
section, has said:
Thus, if the buyer's own fault or negligence contributes to the
injury, as might be the case where he used the goods with knowl-
edge of their defects, he cannot recover consequential damages.
These damages are not proximately related to the breach of war-
ranty.
1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACrIONAL GUmE TO THE UNIFORM COMERaACL
CODE 1.510102 at 268 (1964). It appears that Mr. Hawkland's example of the
buyer's own negligence could be more accurately described as assumption of
risk
30. A similar factual situation presented itself before the Missouri Supreme
Court recently and that court chose to adopt the Restatement of Torts strict
liability rule. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
1970]
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and attach liability upon A. Another court, however, might
decide that the death was not proximately caused by the lack of
a ground wire and deny recovery.
V. CoNcrusioN
There appears to be no clear-cut answer to the question of
whether contributory negligence should bar recovery in a war-
ranty action.31 As pointed out, some courts, adopting a strict
liability approach, have reasoned that the manufacturer is in a
better position to avoid the injury and thus should pay the price
for its defective products. Other courts have recognized the
relatively new tort theory in warranty actions and allow the
defense in all products liability litigation. Still other courts
have become entangled in the confusion surrounding the nature
of a warranty action, the distinction between contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk, and the distinction between
contributory negligence and misuse of the product. Of course,
in situations where the injury was caused solely by the plain-
tiff's own negligence or where there was actually no breach, the
courts are obviously confused when they deny recovery by say-
ing that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. With these
latter courts one cannot ascertain whether contributory negli-
gence is a defense or not.
The coin is not one-sided. There are persuasive arguments for
both positions. Admittedly the average, unsuspecting consumer
deserves protection and should be afforded the assurance that
the product he purchases will be as warranted. On the other
hand, there are situations where an otherwise insignificant de-
fect in a product contributes to an injury almost totally caused
by the consumer's own negligence, and with these cases it would
seem that a strict liability approach would place an undue bur-
den on the manufacturer.
It has been suggested that a comparative negligence approach
is the best solution to the problem.3 2 In view of the myriad of
situations with varying degrees of fault on the part .of the
31. Contributory negligence is a defense: e.g., Dallison v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior
Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833 (Alas. 1967); Douglas v. W.C. Mallison &
Son, 265 N.C. 362, 144 S.E.2d 138 (1965). Contributory negligence is not a
defense: e.g., Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Hansen v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Jacobs Pharmacy
Co. v. Gipson, 116 Ga. App. 760, 159 S.E.2d 171 (1967).
32. Note, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Lia-
bility it Warranty, 52 MINN. L. Rav. 627 (1968).
[VWol. 22
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manufacturer and the consumer, perhaps this is the best answer.
The courts could determine each case on its own facts and thus
reduce the possibility of an unjust result. An inflexible rule of
strict liability, or equally, one allowing contributory negligence
as a defense, leaves much to be desired.
The reach of any rule, whether it favor the manufacturer or
the consumer, should not be extended so far that it cannot yield
when the facts and justice so demand.
YANcEY A. MCLEOD, JR.
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